The Supreme Court on Tuesday observed that though courts cannot adjudicate on the fundamental religious affairs of a sect, the state has good powers to intervene when the exercise of religious rights affects secular activities, marking a crucial frontier in the ongoing Sabarimala repertoire.
A nine-judge bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant reiterated this distinction during a wide-ranging hearing on the interplay between Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, as it continued to examine the larger issues arising from the row over the entry of menstruating women into a Kerala shrine. The bench also included Justices B V Nagarathna, M M Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, R Mahadevan, Prasanna P Varali and Joymalia Bagchi.
The court stressed that independence in religious matters, especially methods of worship and basic religious practices, remains isolated from judicial scrutiny. However, Justice Nagaratna noted that this protection is not absolute when religious practice extends to areas affecting public life.
To illustrate this point, I noted that while a temple may freely practice its religious rituals, it cannot, under the guise of religion, disrupt civil order. “You carry out your religious activity, but not by blocking roads… The state can always intervene,” the judge said, adding that courts would refrain from interfering in the way of worship but not when secular consequences arise.
This observation goes to the heart of Article 25(2)(a), which allows the state to regulate economic, financial and other secular activities linked to religion, even as Articles 25 and 26 guarantee freedom of religion and sectarian rights.
The session also witnessed sharp interventions from the bench when arguments veered into comparisons between religions. The court warned lawyer Ashwini Upadhyay against presenting any religion, or even language, as superior to others, stressing the need to maintain constitutional neutrality in the courtroom.
At one stage, when the arguments sought to differentiate between religions in terms of hierarchy, Justice Nagaratna replied: “Everyone is equal,” while Justice Amanullah reminded the lawyer that such submissions are made on a “public platform.” Justice Sandrich described the line of discussion as “not in good taste,” prompting the bench to direct the discussion back to constitutional principles.
The proceedings, part of the larger repertoire emerging from the Sabarimala dispute, revolve around the extent to which courts can test religious practices against constitutional guarantees such as equality and non-discrimination.
While some lawyers have argued that “essential religious practices” should remain immune even from social reform, others have asserted that such a doctrine risks insulating exclusionary practices from scrutiny. The submissions also highlighted the complex relationship between individual religious freedom under Article 25 and the collective rights of sects under Article 26.
A group of lawyers seeking a review of the 2018 ruling that allowed entry to the Sabarimala temple for women of all ages has asserted that the rights under Article 26, especially the right to manage religious affairs, are indispensable to the meaningful exercise of the freedoms under Article 25, with one lawyer describing the relationship as “symbiotic and reciprocal.” Senior counsel Madhavi Divan, Sridhar Puttaraju and Nachiket Joshi, and advocates Fauzia Shakeel, Anirudh Sharma, Mathews Nedumbara, Nizam Pasha, Atulesh Kumar and Eklavya Dwivedi argued in support of the review.
One of the main fault lines in the arguments concerned the extent of permissible state intervention. While one group insisted that social reform could not overshadow the fundamental identity of religion, others pointed to constitutional provisions that explicitly permit reform-oriented intervention.
The bench itself seems to recognize this delicate balance. Justice Nagaratna noted that the constitutional provisions enabling reform, particularly in the Hindu context, were drafted in response to historical realities such as caste exclusion, underscoring that the Constitution does not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach across religions. At the same time, the court noted that any action taken by the state must remain proportionate and rooted in constitutionally permissible reasons such as public order, morality and health.
The persistent reference goes back to the 2018 Supreme Court ruling allowing entry to the Sabarimala temple by women of all ages, which overturned a long-standing practice that excluded women of menstruating age. In 2019, while hearing review petitions, the court framed broader constitutional questions about religious freedom without conclusively deciding the issue, and referred it to a larger bench.
The current measures are expected to have far-reaching implications beyond Sabarimala, and will likely shape the legal framework governing interfaith religious practices.
