the The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed the sexual harassment case against the director of a Gurugram-based company, who allegedly used profanity (f*** off) in an email exchange with a former female employee.
The Supreme Court’s April 18 order said that while the use of profanity was “undisdoubly crude and impolite”, it did not constitute a remark of a sexual nature under Section 354-A of the Indian Penal Code.
As per the order, the Supreme Court granted the petition filed by the director of the institution The Gurugram-based company quashed the FIR, along with all subsequent proceedings, including the suit.
However, the manager, against whom the former employee lodged the FIR, was ordered to depose $20,000 to PGIMER Poor Patient Welfare Fund, Chandigarh, within a month.
What was the situation?
The former employee, who joined the company in March 2018 as Business Head (North) of the company, filed an FIR against the man, a director in the same company, on March 10, 2019, alleging that he harassed her and used degrading and abusive language against her.
According to the Supreme Court order, the dispute arose because the employee took four days of medical leave in October 2018, ahead of a company event scheduled for October 20, for which the woman was supposed to be the key person. The order also noted that the manager returned the email and asked the woman to undergo a medical procedure after the event.
The email exchange continued on October 17, 2018, and the dispute escalated when the director wrote “f*** off” at one point. The order indicated that the woman resigned after this exchange, which the manager promptly accepted that evening.
But the exit did not go smoothly. The company served its legal notice on November 11, 2018, citing a breach of contract clause in its appointment letter. She responded with a list of her own: 17 days’ unpaid salary in October, two months’ notice period salary, $25,000 for legal fees, a written apology from the aforementioned director, and a memorandum of understanding.
The company did not comply with the employee’s demands. She then proceeded to file an FIR four months later, alleging sexual harassment.
Arguments
The director’s lawyers argued in court The Supreme Court held that the FIR was time-specific and targeted. They said it was filed after the legal notice and was intended to coerce the manager, not seek justice. The lawyers also claimed that the investigation was unbalanced, as none of the company’s employees were examined, and legal notices were simply ignored.
The argument before the court was that to proceed under Section 354-A required something sexual. The lawyers argued that an offensive word uttered in a heated email message, without any physical advance, request for sexual favors, or any remotely sexual intent, cannot be dressed up as sexual harassment.
But the complainant’s lawyer indicated that the note was of a sexual nature, and that the man used his position as a manager to intimidate and humiliate her.
According to the state’s attorney, the allegations were specific enough to stand trial.
Judgment
The Supreme Court, in its order, referred to a four-step test laid down by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Oregon. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025) to decide quashing the petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The four questions I asked were: Is the material presented by the accused credible? Does it undermine the factual basis of the complaint? Can the Public Prosecution confront it meaningfully? Will going to trial just waste the court’s time? Answering yes to all four is the obstacle to crushing.
The Court also applied the ‘Bhajan Lal Categories’, under which the Supreme Court, in 1992, listed circumstances, including prosecution in bad faith and allegations that do not constitute any crime, in which the Supreme Court could exercise inherent power.
The court held that an FIR was not required under all applicable legal principles.
“The same, though undeniably rude and impolite, does not, in its ordinary sense, carry any sexual connotation or innuendo directed at the modesty or nationality of the complainant,” the Supreme Court held in the order.
According to the order, Section 354-A was not intended for a single rude word in a single email arising from an argument over a leave request, with no sexual theme.
The provisions relate to conduct of a sexual nature: unwanted physical contact, requests for sexual favors, pornographic material, and sexually charged remarks.
The court concluded that the email in question failed to remove any of these barriers, and that continuing the trial would not achieve justice but would only lead to a different kind of harassment.
