Once again, the United States and Iran stand on the brink, with a deliberate military buildup and fragile back-channel diplomacy unfolding in parallel. In a wide-ranging conversation in Hindustan Times Point Blank, Executive Editor Shishir Gupta and Senior Anchor Ayesha Varma unpack how close the region is to a potential strike, why this moment is uniquely dangerous, and where India fits into the rapidly changing equation.
10-day or 24-hour window?
US President Donald Trump has publicly declared that the world will know within ten days whether Washington will reach a deal with Tehran or “take things further” — deliberately vague wording that keeps diplomacy and force on the table. Gupta argues that this timeline is not merely rhetorical; It aligns with a concrete military window where the US Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, from the Mediterranean Sea towards the Red Sea, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
By the end of the month, the Ford will be stationed alongside the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, Los Angeles-class submarines armed with Tomahawk missiles, jamming platforms, and anti-ballistic missile defenses. In Gupta’s assessment, this concentration of firepower is comparable to the military buildup undertaken by the United States before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, creating a moment in which Washington can make a real choice between a diplomatic settlement and a limited but devastating strike. Gupta points out that Trump may have talked about 10 days, but nothing prevents action within 24 hours if he decides that Iran has crossed the red line on its nuclear ambitions.
Area on the edge
While Washington talks about timetables and options, the region is already behaving as if conflict could erupt any day. Gupta reveals that Israeli national security professionals are preparing in very concrete ways – from cleaning and stocking bomb shelters to maintaining a general state of alert. He says similar alerts are emerging in Iran and across parts of the Middle East, where governments and populations are bracing for a potential escalation beyond the ongoing crises in Gaza and Houthi-led instability.
This accumulation of flashpoints, combined with the US fleet abroad and Iran’s disputed nuclear and missile programs, creates what Gupta calls an “unstable” and “dangerous” environment that could “explode at any time.” He believes that neither Tehran nor Washington are particularly inclined to listen to outside advice, raising the risk that miscalculation or internal political pressure could tip the scales toward confrontation.
Conversations in Obscurity: Washington, Tehran, and Domestic Audiences
But even with aircraft carriers moving in and submarines deployed, diplomacy is not dead. Gupta points to indirect talks involving US envoys such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, as evidence that the two sides are still seeking a negotiated outcome, at least as a first resort. The fact that Iran sent a high-level representative indicates that Tehran wants to explore a diplomatic solution before the situation escalates.
However, Gupta emphasizes that US-Iran engagements are historically shaped by the collision of political cultures and domestic compulsions. He says that American officials tend to speak “frankly and frankly,” while Iranian negotiators, who rely on civilized traditions, prefer “ambiguity” and modification – a style that can easily breed confusion and mistrust. On the internal level, Iran must show defiance and continue the narrative it has promoted since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which confirms that it stands in the face of American pressure. For its part, Washington must reassure its people and allies that it will not allow Iran to acquire the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons or launch ballistic missiles capable of reaching Europe – a threshold that Gupta describes as “extremely dangerous.”
The weakness of Iran – and its proxies
Military-wise, Gupta believes Iran is extremely vulnerable at this moment. He asserts that Iran’s air defenses have been severely degraded by previous US and Israeli actions, leaving Tehran with “barely any remaining air defense” to stop incoming US or Israeli missiles. In such a scenario, Iran’s primary option would be to absorb strikes and retaliate with what it has: ballistic missiles and suicide drones, weapons it has already used in previous confrontations.
Further complicating the picture is Iran’s network of proxies across the Middle East – from Hamas and Hezbollah to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kataib Hezbollah and other Sunni Shiite militant groups supplied and supported by Tehran, with Israel, the United States and US bases as the main targets. Gupta argues that many of these groups have been “weakened” by Israeli operations, with Hamas in Gaza “destroyed” and Hezbollah weakened, making this a moment where proxies are less able to mount a decisive counter-reaction. For hawks in Washington, this combination — weak Iranian air defense and vulnerable proxies — makes this “the best time to go to Iran” if the military option is chosen.
Sunni powers: public distance, private relief
Gupta stresses that major Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are unlikely to openly support or facilitate a US strike on Iran. They are expected to publicly reject US use of their air bases for offensive operations, forcing Washington to rely on facilities in Jordan and Qatar instead. However, he suggests that these countries might quietly welcome, under the overall stance, a critical examination of Iran’s regional ambitions, nuclear ambitions and ballistic missile arsenal, given the amount of unrest in their streets that they attribute to Tehran-inspired extremism.
Interestingly, Gupta points out that Iran’s development of ballistic missiles carries inherent risks even for Tehran’s allies, because some of these missiles may not reach their intended targets and could explode prematurely at shorter ranges, adding another layer of chaos to any escalatory cycle.
Balance law in India
In the midst of this chaos, India’s approach is deliberate and cautious. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Israel for a day and hold talks with his “friend” Benjamin Netanyahu, a visit that naturally raises questions about New Delhi’s role as tensions rise. Gupta categorically insists that India’s position is “clear” and not ambiguous: New Delhi will remain out of the conflict militarily and avoid taking sides.
India enjoys long-standing civilizational relations with Iran, deep strategic and defense cooperation with Israel, and a comprehensive partnership with the United States. Given these intertwined relationships, Gupta says, India will push for “restraint and peace” and favor diplomatic tracks over any endorsement of military action, while protecting its interests and citizens in the broader region.
Limited strikes, regime survival, and the Iraqi lesson
Can Iran survive the conflict if it breaks out? Gupta’s answer is precise and conditional. In a limited US strike scenario focused on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile assets, Washington could significantly disrupt Iran’s nuclear program for up to a decade, without needing to completely overthrow the regime. However, an all-out attack would raise the question of regime change, and here Gupta questions the ability of the current Iranian leadership to survive in the face of widespread protests, reports of thousands killed in the streets, and the erosion of the regime’s legitimacy.
At the same time, he cites Iraq’s precedent: the overthrow of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum that fueled the rise of ISIS, underscoring how little control outside powers ultimately have once the regime collapses. He warns that in the absence of clarity about “next steps” and who will rule Iran in the post-conflict phase, M An attempt at regime change could unleash unpredictable and potentially more dangerous forces across the region.
For now, Gupta expects any US action, if ordered, to focus on “specific specific attacks” on nuclear sites and missile capabilities rather than a full-scale war. He also rejects the possibility of an all-out nuclear exchange, arguing that any confrontation would likely involve ballistic missiles, drones and precision strikes rather than nuclear weapons.
Russia, China and the borders of signals
Gupta points out that even Russia and China, often seen as Iran’s geopolitical backers, are unlikely to shift the military balance decisively in this immediate crisis. Their ships are deployed in the Gulf of Aden primarily as part of anti-piracy escort forces, and although the planned joint naval exercises with Iran send a political signal, they do not materially conflict with the size of the US fleet already in theater. He does not expect a “battle on the high seas” between the great powers; Instead, missiles, drones, and stand-off capabilities will dominate any confrontation.
Ultimately, Gupta portrays the moment as one of compressed choices. If Washington intends to use military force to halt Iran’s nuclear and missile path and weaken its proxies, he believes “there could be no better time” than the current configuration of American power and Iranian weakness. If it chooses not to act, Iran will likely continue to enrich uranium, expand the range of its ballistic missiles, and rearm its networks – which would ensure the issue of war and peace in the Gulf is postponed, not resolved.
