The Center told the Supreme Court that it will not allow new hydropower projects in the upper reaches of the Ganges — the Alaknanda-Bagirathi Basin in Uttarakhand — and rejected the recommendations of a court-appointed expert body that had cleared 28 such projects, though seven such projects that have already been commissioned or are at an advanced stage of construction will be allowed to go ahead.
The upper Ganges Basin is among the most ecologically variable stretches of the Himalayas. The Alaknanda-Bajirathi system lies entirely within seismic zones IV and V, the main source of the Ganges River – home to nearly half of India’s population – and is vulnerable to landslides, glacial lake floods, avalanches, tunnel collapses, and geodynamic instability. It hosts endangered and Schedule I species and holds profound cultural and spiritual significance. Repeated disasters have made the cost of misreading this terrain clear.
The affidavit filed by the Union Environment Ministry on Tuesday on behalf of three ministries – Environment, Jal Shakti and Energy – disavows the Expert Body II (EB-II) that recommended implementation of 28 hydropower projects (HEPs). A committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary then reviewed the EB-II list and reduced it to five projects. The Center rejected even these five.
Seven projects – four of which have been commissioned, and three with significant physical and financial progress – will be allowed to proceed: Tehri PSP on Bhagirathi; Tapovan Vishnugad on Dhauliganga; Vishnugadh Pipalkutty on Alaknanda; Singoli Bhatwari on Mandakini; Fata Biong on Mandakini; Madhmaheshwar on Madhmaheshwar Ganga; And Kaliganga II in Kaliganga. Experts warn that even these things carry risks. The EB I report headed by Ravi Chopra also highlighted these concerns.
To be sure, many such projects are underway in other high Himalayan mountain ranges, including Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and Himachal Pradesh.
The affidavit was filed in compliance with the Supreme Court’s January 20, 2026 order, which gave the Union government three months to decide on the committee’s recommendations. The reason behind this is that the Second Executive Council and the Cabinet Secretariat Committee “failed to adequately take into account geological and disaster-related factors, including cumulative and cascading impacts.” She says that any decision regarding health projects here “necessarily calls for a cautious and precautionary approach.”
The three major contributing streams – Alaknanda, Bhagirathi and Mandakini – must maintain a minimum flow of 1,000 cusecs in line with the Haridwar Agreement of 1916 to prevent dry stretches at the bottom of the project structures. The agreement was on the amount of water that should flow through dams, canals and the main leg of the Ganges at Haridwar.
The role of hydropower projects has been under legal scrutiny since the June 2013 Kedarnath blast that officially killed more than 5,000 people, although actual estimates suggest the true number is much higher. The Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance and ordered the environment ministry to study the role of health institutions in the tragedy, leading to the setting up of EB-I, headed by Ravi Chopra of the People’s Science Institute in Dehradun. It reported in April 2014 that 23 of 24 sanitary projects under review would significantly harm biodiversity in the Alaknanda-Bajirathi basins. The Central Electricity Authority and the Central Water Commission disagreed, and recommended encouraging hydroelectric energy as clean energy. With conflicting reports, in May 2014 the Supreme Court halted construction work on all 24 power plants.
In 2015, the court formed EB-II under the supervision of BP Das, a Bhubaneswar-based hydrologist who also worked on EB-I. Das died in 2019. The February 7, 2021 glacial flood on the Rishi Ganga — which destroyed HEP infrastructure in the valley — demonstrated precisely the cascading risks that EB-I had flagged seven years earlier.
Some of the under-construction projects that have been cleared could also have significant environmental impacts and exacerbate disasters, said Ravi Chopra, who headed EB I.
“The first expert panel report was submitted in April 2014. Many of the arguments in the Centre’s affidavit are based on recommendations made by EB-I against promoting new hydropower projects in the upper Ganga basin. The Fata Pyeong project should not be reconsidered at all because it was completely destroyed during the 2013 floods. From what I know, a new company bought it from the previous project developer, who in turn bought it from LANCO, the original developer who went bankrupt,” Ravi Chopra said. Destroy the project.
“Among the main recommendations made by our committee in 2013, two are very important. The first is that we showed the vulnerability of the dams in the sub-glacial zone, which lies above the Main Central Thrust (MCT), and therefore recommended against the construction of these dams. We also said that before the onset of monsoon in 2014, real-time early warning systems should be established in all projects. If these recommendations had been adopted, Tapovan added that the Vishnugad disaster would not have happened in 2013. 2021.
“So it seems that destroying and killing all these workers at the project site is a case of criminal negligence. As of now, Tapovan Vishnugad is in a semi-glacial area. There is no question of continuing with this project. Vishnugad in Pipalkotty is right in the MCT area. That too should be abandoned. And anyone claiming that it is in an advanced state of construction is a lie in Vata Peong. No construction work has been done there. It seems that the government has finally realized, after all these years, that most of these projects are not worth it,” Chopra added. Really follow through.”
“This is the long-awaited victory for Ravi Chopra-led EB-I. The government has finally admitted how HEPs can destroy the Ganges in the upper reaches,” said Hemant Dhyani, member of EB-I. Mallika Bhanot of Ganga Ahvan said the decade-long transformation through EB-II reflects the strength of the pro-hydropower lobby. “The EB-I identified the direct and indirect impacts of major health projects on the Himalayan ecosystem. The EB-II was then formed and was given the terms of reference to suggest design changes to facilitate construction. Now this affidavit takes into account the cumulative impact. The Jal Shakti Ministry has stood its ground since 2016 – and should be given credit,” she said.
