Not a day goes by in New Delhi without a serious discussion in the city or on social media about the importance of strategic independence, and how we must jealously guard it. With Trump’s America harming Indian interests more frequently than ever, anger toward those who critically analyze strategic autonomy has become more evident. Of course, we must maintain our strategic independence. But many of our conversations about strategic autonomy have been unbalanced. We have been discussing its political bases with little emphasis on its material base. Discussing the political foundations of strategic independence without addressing its material basis is like theorizing nuclear deterrence without possessing nuclear weapons.
Let me put it bluntly: the independence of any country is, in essence, a function of its national strength, not of its political intentions or declarations. Let us look at the nature of our material dependence on external forces. The Middle East provides us with most of our energy; Much of the manufacturing comes from China; Technology and capital come from the United States; Russia is replenishing our aging defense stocks; France and Israel (and increasingly the United States) provide us with high-quality military equipment. So, whether we pretend this material background exists or not, Indian state policies cannot ignore this background.
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Although the matter is not unique to India’s case, India faces this dilemma more than other countries, because small countries do not usually face this dilemma. Their problem of autonomy has a clear answer because their ambition has clear limits. A country with a continental landmass, two nuclear-armed rivals, a sea arc to defend, a population of one and a half billion to care for, and an aspiration to become a global power cannot afford to give up its strategic independence. The larger and more ambitious a country, such as India, is, the less willing it is to ally with an outside power. Conversely, the more its physical dependence on external forces, the less its ability to act on its own. Ambition drives India to demand strategic independence, while dependency prevents India from exercising it. It is a function of a comprehensive national power that does not keep pace with its physical size and political ambition.
And I must admit that many of our dependencies are also strengths of our multi-aligned policy. The relationship with Russia provides us with discounted prices and supports military platforms that we cannot yet replace. The American relationship brings technology and capital that no other partner can provide. The French and Israelis give us military capabilities that neither Washington nor Moscow will share. The Chinese supply chain, however dominant and therefore worrying, keeps Indian manufacturing costs competitive and profitable. Our external material weakness is also, read differently, the logic of business diversification without which we would either be dependent on a single partner or lack the resources we so desperately need to grow. Diversifying across competing suppliers gives us room to maneuver so that locks in tighter alignment; A commitment to pure strategic independence would close them off as well.
We can either regret our weaknesses or choose to deal with them intelligently. Therefore, we must know what is strength and what is weakness, and at what moment one becomes the other.
Let us consider here the example of Russia. Russian oil was a source of strength until the advent of Western secondary sanctions. Access to American technology is a power until an unfriendly White House turns it into a weapon. The Chinese supply chain can be tolerated until a border incident renders the supply chain a Chinese weapon. Each of these has been tested in the past five years. To be fair, we didn’t always pass the test. And we didn’t let them all down either.
This has been a continuing condition of Indian foreign policy. Non-alignment has always been a good political position and belief; Physical non-alignment almost never existed. If anything, it is that the material basis for non-alignment is more important today than at any time in our history. We have had serious foreign dependencies over the past decades: American grains were the energy source in the 1960s; The 1970s and 1980s were dependent on Soviet defense; She arrived in the western capital in the 1990s. We have always negotiated our independence against our dependencies, even when our strategic elite used to pretend otherwise. Pretending that our strategic autonomy is non-negotiable has only cost us conceptual clarity.
I believe it is time to focus less on “strategic autonomy” and more on “strategic capacity”: the ability to produce, deploy, replace, and sustain in areas critical to the country. True strategic independence is the product of strategic capability.
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I also believe that multiple biases need to be discussed more openly and without being too embarrassed about them, because they are a serious response to our portfolio of dependency. Sometimes a multiple alignment is a smart hedge, other times it’s a carefully managed weakness. Hedging buys us time, while only material ability buys independence. If we confuse the two, we will continue to confuse the options on the table regarding actual power.
Building material power is politically unattractive, and certainly slower than electoral cycles. Critical metals, semiconductor manufacturing, aircraft engine programs, domestic propulsion, pharmaceutical media, energy storage, or even the creation of fashion brands: these have long build cycles and won’t make headlines any time soon. But this is the difference between a state that can act decisively and a state that can only hedge.
I must make clear that none of what I say is an argument against India’s global geopolitical ambitions, but rather an argument for aligning our language and desire with our material condition. We are a large country with a portfolio of large state dependency, which means that our strategic autonomy will always be partial, negotiated and managed. Therefore, we must know the difference between the political position and the material situation, because in the end, autonomy is built, not just declared. We must live with the gap between our ambition and our capabilities, while trying to bridge this gap.
