The Supreme Court considered that providing false testimony by an election candidate is a “crime against society as a whole” and cannot be allowed to go uninvestigated.
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N Koteswar Singh set aside an order passed by a Gujarat Magistrate based solely on Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), holding that though the same provision does not apply to municipal elections, the alleged act of giving false testimony nonetheless discloses offenses requiring fresh consideration by the trial court.
In its ruling issued on Wednesday, the court affirmed that “if the matter is related to providing false testimony in the electoral process, then this is a crime against society as a whole and must be investigated,” while returning the matter to the judge for further consideration in accordance with the law.
The ruling came on an appeal filed by Chandrikaben Kishore Davda, who had appealed the Gujarat High Court’s refusal to quash criminal proceedings arising from allegations that she had concealed details of properties owned by her husband while contesting the 2015 municipal elections.
The complaint alleged that although the appellant disclosed certain assets, she did not declare several immovable properties bearing her husband’s name in the affidavit accompanying her nomination papers. A judge found a prima facie case and issued subpoenas under Section 125A of the Anti-Terrorism Act, which punishes false statements made by election candidates.
Before the Supreme Court, Davda’s lawyer Namit Saxena said that the NPA governs only parliamentary and legislative elections, and not municipal elections, which are regulated by the Gujarat Municipalities Act and the Gujarat Municipalities (Conduct of Elections) Rules.
Accepting this claim, the court held that Section 125A of the Anti-Terrorism Act does not actually apply to municipal elections. However, she refused to cancel the proceedings altogether.
The court noted that candidates contesting municipal elections in Gujarat are, however, required under election rules to disclose their assets, spouses and dependents while submitting nomination papers.
Rejecting Dafda’s argument that only jointly owned property should be disclosed, the court held that the rules clearly require disclosure of all assets owned by the nominee, spouse, and dependents.
“The word ‘of’ applies equally to ‘myself,’ ‘my spouse,’ and ‘their dependents,’” the ruling said, adding that the comma separating these expressions only serves a grammatical purpose and does not exclude property owned exclusively by a spouse from disclosure.
The court further held that the trial court’s error in invoking the erroneous statutory ruling was merely a remediable irregularity and not a judicial defect requiring annulment of the proceedings.
Referring to previous precedents on the law relating to confession, the bench reiterated that criminal courts take cognizance of crimes and not of individuals. Therefore, an error in stating the applicable penal provision will not invalidate the proceedings if the facts reveal the commission of a cognizable offense and the court otherwise has jurisdiction to proceed.
The Supreme Court also relied on Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which protects criminal proceedings from invalidation due to procedural irregularities unless they have caused a failure of justice.
The bench noted that courts must be careful not to allow technical defects to derail prosecutions at the electoral threshold, especially when the allegations relate to the purity of the electoral process.
The Supreme Court concluded that the judge had erred in limiting his knowledge to a provision that did not apply to municipal elections, so the Supreme Court referred the matter to the court of first instance to reconsider the complaint and take note again in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the law.
