The Iranian Revolutionary Guard used a UAE-based procurement network to secretly acquire advanced Chinese satellite communications equipment linked to Tehran’s drone and missile programme, according to leaked commercial and shipping records reviewed by the Financial Times.These revelations reveal how a company operating out of the United Arab Emirates helped provide sensitive communications technology to the same branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that later launched a massive barrage of drones and missiles at the Gulf state during Iran’s response to the US-Israeli strikes. The documents also highlight sophisticated methods used to conceal the final destination of the shipment and bypass scrutiny despite years of Western sanctions targeting Iran’s military procurement apparatus.Records show that in late 2025, the IRGC Air Force acquired military-grade Chinese satellite antenna equipment through Telesun, a company based in the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. The equipment, manufactured in China, was shipped from Shanghai and routed through the Jebel Ali container port in Dubai before eventually arriving in Iran.The UAE later became one of the main targets of the Iranian retaliatory campaign following the US-Israeli attack on Iranian assets.
Tehran launched more than 2,800 drones and missiles at the Gulf state, including strikes on civilian sites, according to the report.These disclosures are considered particularly sensitive given Abu Dhabi’s traditionally hardline stance towards Tehran. But despite political tensions, the UAE has long remained an important business hub for Iranian companies operating abroad. Analysts have repeatedly warned that the country’s sprawling free trade zones, where oversight can be weaker, create opportunities for sanctions evasion and illicit procurement networks.According to invoices, customs declarations, packing lists and shipping records seen by the Financial Times, Telesun arranged the delivery of a 4.5-meter motorized satellite antenna produced by Chinese company StarWin. The shipment, which weighs approximately 1.8 tons, was described in customs records as “antenna and accessories.”The equipment was initially transported on board the Chinese container ship Zhong Gu Yin Chuan from Shanghai to Jebel Ali Container Terminal 1 in Dubai.
Shipping records reviewed by the newspaper showed that the ship arrived in Dubai on August 28, where it unloaded a container that was later collected by an Iranian ship called Rama 3.Documents indicate that Rama 3 docked at the same dock on November 23 before departing the next day with the cargo towards Iran.However, a Financial Times analysis of GPS data and satellite imagery suggests that the Iranian ship deliberately transmitted false navigational information in an apparent attempt to hide its movements.According to the report, GPS signals from Rama 3 indicated that the ship sailed away from the Gulf and stopped briefly near Oman. But satellite images taken on November 25 showed that the ship was not located at the coordinates it transmitted to surrounding ships.The discrepancy strongly suggests that the ship was “spoofing,” a deceptive maritime practice in which ships broadcast false location data to disguise their true routes and destinations.On November 29, satellite images captured a ship matching the size, shape and appearance of Rama 3 anchored in Iran’s Shahid Rajai Port in Bandar Abbas. The same port was listed on the shipping documents as the final delivery destination for the shipment.The shipment was sent to Erbatat Faragostar Kish (EFK), an Iranian telecommunications company. According to the contract reviewed by the Financial Times, Tillison purchased equipment on behalf of EFK for a project linked to Saman Industrial Group, another Iranian entity.The US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Saman in December 2023, alleging that the company was acting as a commercial front for the Aerospace Forces Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization, the research and development wing responsible for the IRGC’s ballistic missile, drone, and electronic warfare programs.US authorities accused Saman of helping Iran obtain drone-related technology through intermediary companies operating across multiple jurisdictions.
The alleged equipment included antennas, servo motors and other components used in unmanned aerial vehicles.The European Union also imposed sanctions on the Jihad Self-Sufficiency Organization, claiming that it had provided Russia with Iranian drones.EFK itself is not currently subject to Western sanctions.The freight forwarder handling the Iranian side of the deal is identified on the bill of lading as Blue Calm Marine Services.
The United States imposed sanctions on the company in 2023, accusing it of facilitating shipments to another entity linked to the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s missile fuel development program.Telesun publicly describes itself as a UAE-based supplier of fixed and mobile satellite communications systems across the Middle East and North Africa, offering services ranging from “design, installation and commissioning”.Neither Telesun nor the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to questions from the Financial Times regarding these allegations.
The Iranian embassy in London also did not respond.The report adds to growing scrutiny of China-linked technology transfers that support Iran’s military infrastructure. Last month, the Financial Times separately reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s air force had secretly acquired a satellite launched by the Chinese company The Earth Eye. The satellite was allegedly used to monitor US military bases and infrastructure in the Gulf before the attacks in March.Earlier this month, Washington imposed sanctions on The Earth Eye for allegedly supporting Iranian military operations.“The United States will continue to take action to hold China-based entities accountable for their support of Iran,” the US State Department said. “Targeting US service members and partners will not go unanswered.”These disclosures are likely to exacerbate concerns among Western governments about using Gulf commercial centers and international logistics networks to circumvent sanctions imposed on Iran’s military procurement regime. These revelations may also lead to renewed pressure on the UAE to tighten oversight of companies operating within free trade zones amid concerns that sensitive military technology continues to flow to Iran despite years of restrictions and monitoring efforts.
