A fragile Iran truce, a reset in Modi-Trump relations, and a tough case for ‘India First’ – in the latest edition of Point Blank, Shishir Gupta, executive editor of Hindustan Times, shows how these threads are coming together in a crucial few weeks for New Delhi’s foreign and security policy.
The war stops and never ends
The starting point is the imminent interim agreement between Iran and the United States that could lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz after three and a half months of war. US President Donald Trump announced that the blockade will be lifted and an interim arrangement signed on June 19, opening the world’s most important energy corridor to maritime traffic once again. For India, which is heavily dependent on Gulf oil, this alone is a major blow: the 16-day ceasefire has already depressed prices and injected optimism into global markets.
However, as Shishir Gupta emphasizes, this is not a peace agreement; It’s a 60-day respite to negotiate the real prize: the nuclear deal. Washington’s primary military goal in this war was to neutralize Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. He argues that without a verifiable retreat on this front, the next agreement may look like “no deal” at all, not unlike the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that Trump tore up. The Strait of Hormuz, in this reading, has always been a secondary goal for both the United States and Israel, a useful lever but not the primary strategic issue.
This heart consists of three layers.
Iran’s nuclear program, especially enriched uranium.
And the growing arsenal of ballistic missiles.
A network of powerful proxies – Hezbollah, the Houthis, Kataib Hezbollah and others – besiege Israel with long-range missiles and missiles.
Until these matters are addressed, Gupta warns that any celebration is premature; “The devil is in the details” of the text yet to be seen.
Who owns Iranian uranium, and what is its importance?
One interesting subplot is whether a third country is able to actually retain Iran’s enriched uranium in order to ensure the stability of the agreement. Moscow has done so before, and has reportedly offered to do so again, leading to speculation about the Russian role. But Gupta is skeptical, which reflects the American trend that any deposit should be under the guardianship of the neutral International Atomic Energy Agency, and not under the control of a rival superpower.
Bringing Russia – or China, by this logic – to the heart of the Iranian file would, in Washington’s eyes, turn the bilateral war into another arena for competition between major powers. It would also reopen the internal political wound caused by Trump’s alleged closeness to Moscow by effectively “opening a third front” with Russia as the custodian of Iran’s most sensitive material. He points out that true victory for the United States and Israel requires that Iran give up its enriched uranium under arrangements that are technically watertight and politically marketable at home.
For its part, Iran will market anything it comes up with as a victory: it has stood up to the United States militarily, prevented foreign-imposed regime change, demonstrated its ability to close and reopen the Strait of Hormuz at will, and is now even hinting at imposing “maintenance” and “security” fees on energy traffic. This rhetoric of influence will play out strongly in Tehran, regardless of what the fine print says.
Modi-Trump: Tariffs, vectors and a test of relations
All this forms the backdrop to the upcoming meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump on the sidelines of the G7 summit – their first in a year and a half, and by Gupta’s account, a packed agenda. The main topic will be Iran: Modi wants to hear first-hand what the United States believes it has achieved within the framework of a 60-day ceasefire, and what the horizon for nuclear negotiations looks like before New Delhi resets its energy and regional posture.
The second pillar is trade. Under Section 301, the United States has imposed a 12.5% tariff on Indian goods based on forced labor, while Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam – all of which are deeply integrated into Chinese supply chains – face just 10%. An earlier Indian attempt to impose reciprocal tariffs was struck down by the US Supreme Court, forcing New Delhi to return to the table to seek what Gupta calls “competitive tariffs” – parity with peer exporters so that Indian products can maintain their position in the US market. He notes that Washington may try to add another leverage by invoking “excess capacity” as a pretext for imposing new sanctions, but Delhi’s position is straightforward: if tariffs are competitive, it can live with it; If not, friction is inevitable.
The third politically sensitive item is the recent killing of three Indian sailors when American forces targeted an oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman. Gupta says External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s call with Foreign Secretary Marco Rubio was “very difficult” and ended with the two sides talking amongst themselves. Delhi described the use of lethal force as “unjustified.” Washington said the ship violated instructions and attempted to impose a blockade. Gupta believes that Modi will personally make it clear that Indian lives cannot be collateral damage in a war in which India is not a party.
Alongside these flashpoints are a series of structural issues: delays in the supply of F404 jet engines to India, broader supply chain concerns, and the sweeping sweep of the strategic landscape from China and Russia to the Ukraine war and global energy security after the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Despite the tensions, Gupta insists there are “a lot of positives” in the relationship, not least the ability of Modi and Trump to talk openly and directly with each other.
Pakistan’s moment – and its borders
The Iranian file also gave Pakistan a diplomatic role that it had longed for for a long time. In cooperation with Qatar, Islamabad helped broker the interim arrangement that is now close to signing, with some Saudi support behind the scenes. Pakistan’s generals have historically been favored in Washington – from Ayub and Yahya Khan to Zia-ul-Haq and Asim Munir – and the military will showcase this mediation to recast Pakistan as a “major” player rather than a hub for terrorism.
Gupta outlines what Islamabad will seek in return: better equipment from the United States, more money from the IMF and World Bank, and some relief from the Financial Action Task Force, all ultimately aimed at gaining leverage vis-à-vis India. But it also underscores the structural problem: Pakistan is “playing both sides,” courting Washington and Beijing, and purchasing significant defense equipment from each. This dual-track strategy fits well into a broader reality: neither the United States nor China is particularly invested in seeing India achieve unfettered success.
In his view, the current rise in Pakistan may be fleeting. If the Iranian nuclear issue is truly resolved, and the destabilizing role that Tehran has played since the 1979 revolution recedes, the Middle East may calm down. Afghanistan no longer provides Pakistan with the strategic depth it once provided; Once the Iran file is closed, Washington’s attention will return to the adversaries it “should have been focusing on in the first place” — China and, to a lesser extent, Russia.
India first in the post-delusion West
Perhaps the most surprising part of the conversation is Gupta’s argument that India should stop seeing the world through American, Chinese or Russian lenses and return to a purely interests-based “India first” approach. He points out that the border crises of 1962, Doklam, and May 2020 all underscored the same lesson: in the end, India stands alone on its borders. . This means buying Russian oil if it keeps the economy going, getting tough on Pakistani and Chinese military acquisitions, and investing heavily at home in defense R&D and manufacturing.
Oddly enough, he credits Trump with accelerating this strategic reflection. By pressuring India over tariffs and pressuring Delhi during the Indo-Pakistani skirmishes, Washington forced India to accept that it could not depend on any outside supplier — American, European, or otherwise — for vital military equipment. The push for domestic production and defense exports is, he says, one of the “positive” outcomes of the US hard line.
Gupta also argues that Trump has punctured the West’s moral high ground by exposing uncomfortable truths: the Jeffrey Epstein scandal and the ways in which elites are being endangered; Accusations of election fraud by agents of the FBI, CIA, and law enforcement; and, more recently, the official acknowledgment that US funding went to gain-of-function research linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. It suggests that when a virus that has killed millions spills over from such research, and when Western leaders do not even mention its origins after Trump explicitly called it the “Chinese virus,” old certainties about Western virtue are eroding.
This erosion, according to Gupta’s account, is consistent with hard-line realism in Delhi, Washington, and Jerusalem alike. Both Modi and Trump are unapologetically “country first” leaders; Netanyahu operates according to similar calculations regarding Israel’s survival. Whether it is the United States being asked to respond to Iran’s nuclear program, Israel striking Hezbollah and the Houthis in response to proxy attacks, or India purchasing cut-price Russian crude oil, the pattern is the same: major powers act on the basis of narrow national interests, not abstract alliances.
For India, the implication is stark. Its place in the “community of nations” will not be secured by choosing a camp, but by building enough economic and military heft to say no – to tariffs that undermine its exporters, to operations that kill its sailors, to rhetoric that demands it be pro-anyone but itself. Gupta believes that in a world where everyone has given up on pretending, it is time for Delhi to be unabashedly pro-India, systematically and strategically.
