The Indus River system consists of six major rivers – the Indus, Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej – that flow through the territories of both India and Pakistan. This system supports drinking water, agriculture and electricity generation across the Indus Basin, supporting hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the border.
When British India was partitioned in 1947, the Indus River system was also divided between the two successor states.
The geographical reality was stark: India, as an upper riparian country, controlled the headwaters of most rivers, while the agricultural heartland of Pakistan – the heavily irrigated plains of Punjab – depended crucially on constant water flows from the east.
For its part, India has requested access to the system to achieve its development goals in Punjab and Rajasthan, while seeking stability and normalization of relations with its new western neighbour.
Despite its pressing domestic needs, India concluded a highly concessionary water-sharing agreement with Pakistan on September 19, 1960, an agreement facilitated by the World Bank.
Negotiations – India paid the price for rationality
Pakistani Delay Strategy and World Bank Proposal of 1954:
The course of the negotiations was shaped, from the beginning, by an asymmetry between India’s reasonable and constructive approach and Pakistan’s extreme, and sometimes ridiculous, demands – an asymmetry that ingrained the outcome more favorably for Pakistan than justice would have warranted.
The World Bank’s first substantive proposal on February 5, 1954 makes this abundantly clear: even at this initial stage, it required significant unilateral concessions from India:
All Indian development projects planned along the upper reaches of the Indus and Chenab were to be abandoned, with the benefits accruing to Pakistan instead.
• India has been asked to refrain from diverting approximately 6 MAF aircraft from the Chenab River.
• Chenab water at Mirala (now in Pakistan) will not be available for Indian use.
• Water development will not be allowed in Kutch from the river system.
Despite these significant constraints, India accepted the proposal in good faith almost immediately, indicating its genuine desire for a quick solution. In contrast, Pakistan delayed its formal acceptance by nearly five years until December 22, 1958.
As a result of this goodwill gesture by India, restrictions were imposed on it while Pakistan continued to develop new uses of the western rivers without similar restrictions.
Pakistan learned the lesson that obstruction has a cost and cooperation is costly, and it has applied that lesson consistently ever since.
What India lost: the scale of the sacrifice
Water distribution:
Under the treaty’s allocation formula, India got exclusive rights to the three eastern rivers – the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi – while Pakistan got rights to the waters of the three western rivers – the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum.
India has been permitted some limited, non-consumptive uses of western rivers within its territory, primarily for downstream hydroelectric generation, subject to overall design and operational limitations.
In terms of volume, the eastern rivers allocated to India carry approximately 33 million acre-feet of annual flow, while the western rivers allocated to Pakistan carry approximately 135 million acre-feet – giving Pakistan nearly 80 percent of the system’s water. India obtained 20% of this share, in exchange for giving up all its claims to the larger Western system.
The crucial point is that India did not get new water from the agreement. What India got was formal recognition of the flows it had already received, in exchange for abandoning all claims to the larger Western system.
India has been permitted certain non-consumptive uses of western rivers within its territory – primarily downstream hydroelectric generation.
Financial concession: Payment to donate water
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the treaty is the financial clause. India agreed to pay nearly £62 million (about $2.5 billion in current value) in compensation to Pakistan for building water resources infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
This payment represents a unique precedent in that an upstream state, which was already giving up the majority of the system’s waters, additionally paid a downstream state for the “privilege” of doing so.
India supported Pakistan’s acceptance of the deal, which was strongly favorable to Pakistan on the core issue of water allocation.
Structural injustice of the treaty
Asymmetric unilateral restrictions on India: The treaty imposes a series of specific design and operational restrictions on India’s use of the western rivers that have no corresponding obligations on the Pakistani side:
• India can develop only a limited irrigated crop area (ICA) in its territory.
• India faces strict limits on the volume of water that can be held in any storage facility on western rivers.
• India must adhere to specific design standards for any hydropower facilities on western rivers, including restrictions on basins and storage capacity.
These restrictions are unidirectional: they restrict India’s legal development of resources within its territory, while not imposing any similar transparency requirements or restrictions on Pakistan. The result is a treaty that treats the upstream country – India – as the party needing supervision and restraint, while the downstream country benefits from guaranteed flows.
Author: Pradeep Kumar Saxena (former Indian Indus Water Commissioner).
