Eight months after the crash of AI 171 in June 2025, an Air India Boeing 787-8 was grounded after its flight from London to Bengaluru in February 2026. The reason: a faulty fuel control switch.
According to the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MOCA), the plane was grounded after a report in the “Pilot Defect Report” said the fuel control switch slid from “RUN” to “CUTOFF” when it was pressed slightly. The key also was not positively locked in its designated position, the report stated.
Based on the recommendations of the original equipment manufacturer (read: Boeing), the airline inspected and tested the fuel control switches (FCS) according to established procedures. They found that the fuel control switch “operated mechanically as designed and the unit was considered serviceable.” Aviation authorities also decided to send the fuel control switch from the Boeing 787-8 to the United States for further examination, although initial checks did not find anything wrong. Within days of grounding the plane, the plane was back in operation.
While the final word on the Keys, which appear to have “developed a mind of their own,” has yet to be heard, several conspiracy theories abound in the industry as it awaits the final report on the cause of the crash of AI 171, another Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner, that killed 260 people. People outside the investigation but familiar with this writer told this writer that the final report was unlikely to be published before August, although members of the investigation team said they still knew nothing about the matter. News reports said the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may submit an interim report publicly in June.
Meanwhile, two different camps with hard-line positions on the possible cause of the crash have emerged over the past year.
Read also: AI 171 pilot “deliberately closed the fuel switches”: Italian report’s claim on the final outcome of the investigation
One is led by India’s pilot community, but many others support his theory, including some industry insiders, experienced aircraft engineers and Indian Air Force veterans. This group argues that while the “pilot did it” theory may be the most plausible of all, it is more likely that the problem began with a short or malfunction of some kind, causing the Ram Air Turbines (RAT) to deploy almost as soon as takeoff. On the B787, the RAT is deployed in the event of a dual generator failure or major electrical failure.
Furthermore, they claim that all circumstantial evidence – such as the melting of the rear recorder – points to the possibility of an electrical fire, which is more deadly than a fuel fire. As one person from this group put it: “In all the explanations offered by the Air Accident Investigation Board so far, nothing explains why the Air Accident Investigation Team deployed as soon as the plane was in the air – which was visible even when the plane was still directly above the runway.” The initial report also refrains from specifying when the RAT was deployed. Although several postmortems have demonstrated RAT deployment within 4-8 seconds after liftoff.
A recent report from Safety Matters says four indicators in the initial report submitted by the AAIB all point to one conclusion: that electrical power failed shortly after takeoff. He argues that the fact that the plane’s speed had no source, that one doesn’t know which pilot said what because the pilot’s boom microphones needed power and died before the conversation, the tail box melted internally, and the gear froze mid-retract, all points to the only possible explanation: a massive electrical failure/failure. Furthermore, the organization adds that the Boeing 787 that flew as AI 171 was not an aircraft without a past, and had a recorded history of frequent circuit breaker trips, short circuits, overheating events, and a complete electrical panel fire in 2022.
This camp also argues that the “Pilot Did It” group seeks to scapegoat the leader, who cannot speak in his own defence, and that this would absolve both Air India and Boeing of all responsibility.
The second camp blames the accident on deliberate experimental work. This group bases its argument largely on the conversation described in the AAIB’s initial report. The cockpit audio recording showed one pilot asking the other why he was cutting fuel, and the other replied that he was not doing so, the report says. This group assumes that it was the first officer (Clive Conder who was the flying pilot) who asked the question to the commander (Sumit Sabharwal). This is a logical assumption because the first officer (FO) was busy with the takeoff (focused outward), and the commander or captain was the pilot’s spotter (focused inward).
To support this line of argument, this camp argues that this is why the pilot allowed the FO to handle the takeoff. “If he had done the same thing at 30,000 feet, for example, there would have been enough time for his colleague to notice the action and reverse it, allowing the plane to recover,” says one person from this group. “At best, you would only fall a certain number of feet, but reversing the fuel cutoff (returning to RUN) would ensure the plane didn’t crash.”
Each theory has a different set of implications.
For Boeing, Air India and Tata Sons, the consequences of an electrical failure would be severe and far-reaching. The airline was already on the government’s radar for safety concerns before June 2025. In particular, a memorandum prepared by former Director General of Civil Aviation Vikram Dev Dutt during his tenure at the DGCA (2023-2024) cited several concerns about the airline’s safety practices. “Any reason pointing to Air India’s liability would be particularly damaging to the Tata group because the country’s highest aviation safety authority had issued a warning before the incident, and (the inaction) could amount to criminal negligence, if pursued in a court of law,” a senior government official said, requesting anonymity.
Whatever the final report ultimately delivers – when it sees the light of day – the whole saga promises to leave a bitter taste in the mouths of the aviation public and the industry that enables it.
(Anjuli Bhargava writes on governance, infrastructure and the social sector. Views expressed are personal)
