Not only did the Supreme Court on Thursday refuse to reopen its order allowing the termination of a 15-year-old Delhi girl’s 30-week pregnancy, but it also brought India’s Chief Justice Surya Kant’s journey full circle, as the country’s top judge reflected on how the issue of reproductive autonomy and the mother’s best interest arose 16 years ago — only for the law to take a different tack.
Refusing to entertain a curative petition filed by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), the CJI-led bench also comprising Justice Joymalia Bagchi made it clear that neither the Center nor medical institutions can take the place of the individual in matters of reproductive choice. “Let us not make it a battle between the state and its citizens,” the court said on Thursday, warning against framing the case as a battle between “an unborn child and a child.”
But even as the court emphasized the primacy of autonomy, the session turned into a moment of continuity and contrition.
Referring to his tenure as a judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the chief justice told the courtroom, “The first judgment in the country on such a matter was delivered by me as a judge of the Supreme Court,” referring to the 2009 judgment that dealt with termination of pregnancy in a case involving a vulnerable woman.
This case, like the present one, arose from a contested question as to whether the state could intervene, citing its role as parents (for the benefit of the people), to override a woman’s choice in matters of pregnancy. The High Court was asked to decide whether continuing a pregnancy could be justified in the “best interests” of the woman, even when it conflicted with her mental and physical health and life circumstances.
In considering this case, the Supreme Court bench, led by Justice Kant, and also including Justice A.G. Masih (now a Supreme Court Justice), grappled with a conflict that has now resurfaced – that of balancing the rights of the fetus against the dignity, bodily autonomy and future of the pregnant individual. Drawing on comparative case law and ethical principles, the 2009 ruling emphasized that reproductive choice cannot be removed simply because a state claims to be acting preventively.
Surprisingly, many of the facts in the 2009 case mirror the current controversy. Both involve vulnerable individuals whose abilities or circumstances increase the risk of coercion (a mentally disabled woman residing in a social care institution in the 2009 case who became pregnant as a result of repeated rapes, and a minor in the latter case); Both witnessed the intervention of state authorities to take what they described as a “preventive” position. In both, medical and institutional opinions were shown to be decisive, requiring the court to affirm that such expertise could not override individual choice. Both cases essentially raise the same constitutional question as to whether the state can decide for women, or should instead enable them to decide for themselves.
In the 2009 ruling, Justice Kant said: “Given the victim’s mental condition or suspected physical disability, we have no reason to doubt that the continuation of the pregnancy would constitute serious injury and may lead to a further deterioration in the victim’s mental health.”
In conclusion, the judge declared that the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Law of 1971 cannot prejudice the constitutional powers of the Constitutional Court, especially its judicial jurisdiction, which must be exercised in the interests of the custodian. “We accordingly refused to accept that in the case of a mentally retarded pregnant woman, the medical termination of her pregnancy must always depend on her decision,” the statement said.
However, as the International Committee of Justice noted on Thursday, this path has stalled. “Unfortunately, the Supreme Court stayed the matter,” Justice Kant said, describing the intervention as “unfortunate” and “unnecessary.” He added that if this had not been stopped, the law would have been settled by now.
In an August 2009 order, the Supreme Court bench, led by CJI KG Balakrishnan, ordered that the woman carry the child to term and that a state-run institution take care of the woman and the child.
The ICJ’s observation highlighted how legal issues first encountered in 2009, around autonomy, consent and the limits of state intervention, continue to arise in fragmented litigation, often requiring constitutional courts to intervene on a case-by-case basis.
These questions resurfaced in the latest case. The court was hearing a curative plea by AIIMS, which argued that termination at this stage is not medically viable and could lead to premature live birth or long-term health consequences for the minor.
The court rejected this logic, and considered that the final decision rests with the pregnant woman and her guardians, and not with the state or its institutions. Describing the situation as a “fetus versus child” conflict, the court held that the law must prioritize the dignity, future and well-being of the 15-year-old.
“Nothing under the sun or on earth can force her to carry a fetus to term when she does not want to,” the Chief Justice observed, emphasizing the trauma and life-altering consequences of forced motherhood.
After the court refused to entertain the curative petition, Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhatti told the bench that AIIMS would go ahead with terminating the relationship within the day.
Even as it asked AIIMS not to press its curative petition, the bench noted that the legal framework itself may require reconsideration. CJI Kant suggested that timelines under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971 may not adequately address cases of rape and severe trauma, suggesting the need for a more flexible, rights-based approach.
In many ways, this case reflects the closing of the loop. The principles articulated in 2009 on autonomy, dignity and the limits of state control have now been reaffirmed at the highest levels. For CJI Kant, the moment was reflexive and consequential: a reminder of an earlier attempt to settle the law, and how that incomplete conversation had now returned, demanding resolution.
