In late 2013, the White House in Washington DC – under then-President Barack Obama – embarked on a multi-national, complex and ambitious journey to negotiate with Iran to curtail its nuclear program. The United States, along with some of its allies, particularly Israel, is convinced to a degree that Tehran is out to develop a nuclear weapons program. Negotiations with Germany and a consortium of UN Security Council members, known as the P5+1, led to an agreement in 2015 called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Its aim was to put safeguards around the Shiite power’s nuclear activities, which its then-president Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei maintained were for civilian use only.
The Trump years
In 2018, when Donald Trump’s first presidency began, the US pulled out of the deal, leaving not only Iran in the lurch but also its allies in Europe. Russia and China, technically Iran’s allies but do not want a nuclearized West Asia, also remain stumped. Mr. JCPOA is ridiculous and was negotiated in a way that did not secure US interests. Trump has long argued. Fast forward to 2025. Now, as Mr. Trump runs for a second term as president, the US, along with Israel, has bombed Iran’s nuclear and air defense sites, a story that has damaged the country’s ability to pursue such weapons.
However, a few months after the attacks, Mr. Trump is now pursuing a deal through diplomacy, Mr. Just like Obama did and won, but it’s not perfect. In a speech at the United Nations in 2012, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who showed a drawing depicting the various stages of progress in Iran’s nuclear program, held Tehran off as a non-negotiable security target. With Mr. Obama and later with President Joe Biden, Mr. Netanyahu had limited success. But Mr. With Trump, it’s an opportunity as Israel’s leader can market his state’s popular intelligence apparatus’ assessment that Iran is moving toward nuclear weapons. Although US expectations are different, Mr. Mr. Trump in the ear. Netanyahu’s whispers won the battle.
Now, in 2026, Mr. Trump seems to want his own JCPOA. Today’s language from the White House resembles that of the pre-Obama era. “…I insist that talks with Iran continue, to see if a deal can be reached,” he said. “If it can be done, I will tell the Prime Minister that it is a priority. If it can’t be done, we will have to see what the outcome will be,” said Mr. When Mr. Netanyahu met. Trump said. American mediators had to go to the White House once again as they met their Iranian counterparts in Muscat.
Escalation is not what the Arab powers want
Arab powers in the Gulf, despite their own troubles with Tehran, have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in Mr. Trump over the past year or two, and do not want to see military escalation. And it’s not just them. Others around the world see the talks as a success rather than a failure to avoid plunging the region into another conflict that could drag on for years if it spreads. Iran has made no bones about having a strike-back kinetic capability — a claim that analysts and officials take increasingly seriously. Further threats from Tehran to retaliate against US military facilities in the region, which is heavily populated by Gulf countries, have sent concerns soaring. The pressure is not coming from Iran’s intentions, but Mr. Inability to predict or influence Trump’s thinking.
Shares for India
At a time when the world finds itself more chaotic than ordered, the return of the Iran file as a point of geopolitical friction poses new challenges for many. India, for example, was a supporter of the earlier JCPOA process. In fact, New Delhi highlighted to its counterparts in Tehran the benefits of the deal, such as the easing of sanctions and the return of oil trade. Iran, one of India’s top two oil suppliers, has suffered as US pressure peaks. JCPOA appeared to be the way out. But despite its focus on oil or Chabahar port in general, long-term Indian connectivity investment, Tehran remains an important political player – given its fractured relationship with Pakistan, its pragmatism with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its posture in Central Asia with Turkish and Pakistani influences. Iran offers much more to India than its West Asian policies.
Finally, Iran also stood in the way. internal Protests are persistent, undermining the political stability of the state. The once powerful ‘moderates’ were forced to join forces with their conservative counterparts to construct a nationalist narrative following the US bombings. Domestic power plays, as before, heavily influence external outcomes. Any victory in these negotiations is a better option than the alternatives provided by the largest American military build-up in the region since 2003.
Kabir Taneja is the Middle East Executive Director of the Observer Research Foundation
